We live in turbulent times, our world is changing at accelerating speed. Information is everywhere, but wisdom appears in short supply when trying to address key inter-related challenges of our time such as; runaway climate change, the loss of biodiversity, the depletion of natural resources, the on-going homogenization of culture, and rising inequity. Living in such times has implications for education and learning. This book explores the possibilities of designing and facilitating learning-based change and transitions towards sustainability. In 31 chapters (...) contributors from across the world discuss (re)emerging forms of learning that not only assist in breaking down unsustainable routines, forms of governance, production and consumption, but also can help create ones that are more sustainable. The book has been divided into three parts: re-orienting science and society, re-connecting people and planet and re-imagining education and learning. This is essential reading for educators, educational designers, change agents, researchers, students, policymakers and entrepreneurs alike, who are concerned about the well-being of the planet and convinced of our ability to do better. The content and related issues can be discussed on the blog by editor Arjen Wals: Transformative learning. 'We are living in times of incertitude, complexity, and contestation, but also of connectivity, responsibility, and new opportunities. This book analyses the consequences of these times for learning in formal, non-formal, and informal education. It explores the possibilities offered by the concept of sustainability as a central category of a holistic paradigm which harmonizes human beings with Earth. To change people and to change the world are interdependent processes - this book contributes to both.' Moacir Gadotti, Director of Paulo Freire Institute, São Paulo, Brazil 'I hope you share my excitement about the innovations for sustainability that this book catalogues and analyses. While the ecological news is grim, the human news is not. Even in a time of accelerating change, people are showing their enormous capacities to learn, adapt, restore and protect.' From the Foreword by Juliet Schor, author of ‘True Wealth: how and why millions of Americans are creating a time-rich, ecologically-light, small-scale high-satisfaction economy’ 'This book implies a ‘culture of critical commitment’ in educational thinking and practice - engaged enough to make a real difference to social-ecological resilience and sustainability but reflexively critical enough to learn constantly from experience and to keep options open in working for a sustainability transformation.' From the Afterword by Stephen Sterling, Professor of Sustainability Education, Centre for Sustainable Futures, Plymouth University, United Kingdom. (shrink)

A highly contentious issue in recent philosophy of logic has been the question of whether there can be contingently true identity statements. In this paper I want to investigate a possible loop-hole in the standard argument of the necessitarians (i.e., those who maintain that any true identity statement is necessarily true).

Argues that there can be interaction without breaking physical laws: e.g. by basic psychic forces, or by varying physical constants, or especially by arranging fractal trees of physical causation leading to behavior.

Eric T. Olson has argued that those who hold that two material objects can exactly coincide at a moment of time, with one of these objects constituting the other, face an insuperable difficulty in accounting for the alleged differences between the objects, such as their being of different kinds and possessing different persistence-conditions. The differences, he suggests, are inexplicable, given that the objects in question are composed of the same particles related in precisely the same way. In response, I show (...) that the differences are not at all inexplicable once it is recognized that the conditions for a persisting object to be composed by certain particles at a moment of time must involve facts concerning other moments of time, and that the relevant facts are different for persisting objects of different kinds. Philosophers who neglect this sort of constraint on composition principles may be said to be victims of the 'cinematographic fallacy'. (shrink)

Academia bases reputation and standing on the number of published articles. As a result, the abilities and potential of researchers are also being judged by the number of articles they write, as well as on the impact factor of the journals in which their articles are being published. In itself this is not a problem, although one could of course question the assumption that the quantity of the output reflects the competence of individual researchers. As Altman has stated: “The length (...) of a list of publications is a dubious indicator of ability to do good research.”1 However, if senior faculty decide that the career progress of junior researchers in academia should be based on these criteria, academic medicine is bound to fail in fulfilling its role, namely maximising the quality of medical research and doing research for the right reasons. And to some extent it already has.1 …. (shrink)

The author addresses two questions concerning hume's philosophy: (1) why is imagination so prominent in hume's thought? and (2) what exactly did hume mean by imagination? (staff).

This paper assesses several prominent recent attacks on the view that epistemic justification is conceptually prior to knowledge. I argue that this view—call it the Received View (RV)—emerges from these attacks unscathed. I start with Timothy Williamson’s two strongest arguments for the claim that all evidence is knowledge (E>K), which impugns RV when combined with the claim that justification depends on evidence. One of Williamson’s arguments assumes a false epistemic closure principle; the other misses some alternative (to E>K) explanations of (...) a putative fact about the evidence a particular subject has. Next, I neutralize each of Jonathan Sutton’s three recent arguments to the conclusion that any justified belief constitutes knowledge. Finally, I consider a recent analysis of justification due to Alexander Bird, according to which justified belief is possible knowledge. I argue that Bird’s analysis delivers neither a sufficient nor (more importantly) a necessary condition for justification. [Word count: 149]. (shrink)

Rhetorica approaches armed, sword drawn, announcing the persuasive allure of violence. Whether with real or metaphorical weapons people can be "terrifying and eloquent," to borrow a phrase from Philippe-Joseph Salazar's Words Are Weapons: Inside ISIS's Rhetoric of Terror. The iconic image of Rhetorica's sword emerged from the early modern era of European rhetorical thinking, but the image is one with the violent symbolism that has been attached to rhetoric throughout its history and across cultures. The Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition abounds with (...) examples, deriving in part from the Aristotelian observation that fear can be manipulated for persuasive purposes... (shrink)

The general thesis of this small, well written, but somewhat austere, volume is that Rousseau’s concept of the state of nature is the core of his theoretical teaching. While this is not a particularly surprising thesis, Plattner does show the extent to which Rousseau radicalized the notion of the state of nature. Since Hobbes it had been almost impossible to begin a political discourse without reference to the state of nature as the point of departure. Rousseau, in effect, destroyed this (...) tradition by arguing that history rather than nature provided the true point of departure, and that natural right or natural law consequently provided no ground for political obligation. (shrink)

The relations between reason, motivation and value present problems which, though ancient, remain intractable. If values are objective and rational how can they move us and if they are dependent on our contingent desires how can they be rational? E. J. Bond makes a bold attack on this dilemma. The widespread view among philosophers today is that judgements contain an irreducible element of personal commitment. To this Professor Bond proposes an account of values as objective and value judgements as true (...) or false, employing a distinction between grounding and motivating reasons to establish their connection with action. He defines and tests his position against a number of recent theories, providing in the process forceful criticism of Williams, Wiggins, Foot, Narveson and Nagel, among others. A distinctive contribution to the subject, it will stimulate interest and worthwhile debate among philosophers, while also serving as an introduction to this vital topic. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe; Indicative and counterfactual conditionals, Analysis, Volume 39, Issue 3, 1 June 1979, Pages 139–141, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/39.3.139.